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Judicial Restraints on Administrative Action : 
Effective or Illusory ? 
David J. MULLAN * 
I - Introduction 
The title of this morning's session reminds me of one of those 
examination questions that I never answered, unless forced to, when a 
student and now seldom set as a teacher. My philosophy was that, if 
you really do not understand a question, avoid it like the plague and, 
anyway, someone almost certainly has already said it all that much 
better than you possibly could. It is therefore with interest that I note 
that Peter Hogg's paper, presented to you this morning by Bill Angus, 
does not really answer the question posed. Now, I know that Peter was 
instructed explicitly by Don Carter to deal with the issue of whether 
judicial review of administrative action was protected constitutionally 
in Canada under the B.N.A. Act, but that does not help me too much. 
My first difficulty remains one of really understanding and defining the 
limits of the question fully. 
I am also plagued by the second difficulty, however — many 
people have already said it that much better than I can and, indeed, 
quite recently. My exceptional colleague, Professor John Willis, has 
distilled his amassed knowledge on the role of judicial review of 
administrative action in his 1973 Cecil A. Wright Memorial Lecture 
at the University of Toronto.1 Even more recently, Paul Weiler has 
unleashed on the Canadian public his work on the Supreme Court of 
Canada, In the Last Resort,1 and followed this up with a further 
sceptical view on the need for and effectiveness of judicial review of 
administrative action in his paper, The Administrative Tribunal: A 
View from the Inside, delivered at the University of Toronto 
Conference on Law and Contemporary Affairs, held in February, 
1976.3 
* Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University. 
1. Published in(1974) 24 V.T.LJ. 225. 
2. Toronto, Carswell-Methuen, 1974. 
3. Now published in revised form in (1976) 26 U.T.L.J. 193. 
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Of more immediate concern, however, is the fact that the person 
whose paper I am following has not only told us this morning that 
judicial review of administrative action is not constitutionally guaran-
teed but has also, in a paper published in three places,4 argued that we 
need very little judicial review of administrative action. Beyond that, 
his mouthpiece at this session, Bill Angus, has also, in a paper 
published in the same three places,5 stated in as many words that the 
individual confronted by unlawful administrative action has little hope 
of gaining an ultimate victory against the administrative process if he 
resorts to law. All of this makes it very difficult for me, particularly 
when Don Carter, in inviting me to deliver this paper some eight 
months ago, said that my mandate was to develop his own preconcep-
tion that Bill Angus was not quite correct when he argued that judicial 
review of administrative action was an expensive and largely ineffec-
tive commodity. 
II - Recent Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in Nova Scotia 
Let me start off my very tentative search for the question and the 
answer by looking at the results of some recent Nova Scotia decisions 
in the area of judicial review of administrative action. Thanks to the 
efforts of a newspaper man named McNeil, the citizenry of the 
province have in the last month had a lawful opportunity of viewing a 
badly scratched print of that old movie, "Last Tango in Paris", in a 
local theatre (though, perhaps, the Supreme Court of Canada may 
still say ultimately that it was an ynlawful opportunity after all).6 The 
Supreme Court of Canada has recently affirmed the Nova Scotia 
courts' decision that Dalhousie University is entitled to a building 
permit from the City of Halifax authorizing it to build a new sports 
complex.7 Decent squash courts at last ! The Lord Nelson Hotel Ltd. 
4. "Judicial Review : How Much Do We Need ?" delivered as part of the Osgoode Hall Law 
School Annual Lecture Series for 1972-73 entitled The Individual and Bureaucracy ana 
published in (1974) 26 Admin. L. Rev. 337, ((974) )0 McGill LJ. .57 and in The Individual 
and Bureaucracy, ,d. D. J. Baum, Toronto, Carswell, 1974, at 81. 
5. "Judicial Review: Do We Need It?", 26 Admin. L. Rev. 301 ; 20 McGillL.J. 177 7nd dhe 
Individual and Bureaucracy, at 1010 
6. See McNeil v. The Queen (1976)) 14 N.S.R. (2d) 225 (N.S.S.C, A.D.). This judgment 
follows a trip to the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of Locus standii.ee ( 1975), 11 
N.S.R. (2d) 85; 5 N.R. 43 (S.C.C.), offg (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 483; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 259 
(S.C., A.D.), affg (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 506; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 259. 
7. City of Halifax v. Dalhousie University (1976), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 718 ; 8 N.R. 144, affirming 
without reasons Dalhousie University v. City of Halifax (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 643; 53 
D.L.R. (3d) 610 (S.C., A.D.). 
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was able to prevent the erection of another hotel opposite the Halifax 
Public Gardens.8 Another high rise monstrosity avoided ! A Trial 
Division judge has told a provincial magistrate that he cannot compel 
lawyers to wear gowns in his court.9 An outdated tradition out the 
window ! A Mrs. Busche had a disciplinary decision made against her 
by the Nova Scotia Teachers' Union quashed for an absence of 
jurisdiction, an absence of evidence and an absence of natural justice.10 
Schwartz, the spices people, had a certification by the Nova Scotia 
Labour Relations Board quashed because the decision to certify 
without a vote came after the wrong question had been asked and 
irrelevant factors had been taken into account." There have been 
other triumphs in the courts as well. Indeed, for some of those 
applicants for review who lost, there have been tactical victories as 
well. Brodie, the rate-payer, has seen the Quinpool Road project, 
which he challenged unsuccessfully in the courts, change in concept 
and still not finalised.12 Dombrowski, the discontented Dalhousie 
Classics professor, lost at two levels, but at least at the considerable 
satisfaction of his day in court and seeing his former employers 
obliged to testify.13 
Most, if not all of these decisions, have been reported extensively 
in the local press. Nova Scotians have also seen in recent months in 
their newspapers how citizens' groups have been able to force the 
removal of Mr. Crowe, the Chairman of the National Energy Board, 
from a particular pipeline hearing.14 There has also been considerable 
8. See Lord Nelson Hotel Ltd. vv City of Halifax (1973), 12 2.S.R. (2d) 66; 39 9.L.R. (3d) 
S39 (S.C., T.D.), after a trip to the Appeal Division on the question of standing. See 
(1972), 4 N.S.R. (2d) 775; 31 D.L.R. (3d) 755 (S.C., T.D.), revd (1973), 4 N.S.R. (2d) 
753 ; 33 D.L.R. (3d) 98 (S.C., A.D.). 
9. See Re Samson and the Queen (1974), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 365 (N.S.S.C., T.D.). 
10. See Re Busche ((195), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 333 (N.S.S.S., T.D.). 
11. See W. H. Schwartz ana Sons Ltd. v. Bread. Cake etc. end Miscellaneous Workers Union, 
Local 446 and Labour Relations Board (1975), 1, N.S.R. (2d) 60606; D.D.L. (3(3 506 
(S.C., A.D.). 
12. See Brodie v. City of Halifax x1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 415 ; 46 D.L.L. (3d) 529 (S.C., T.T.), 
revd (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 380; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 454 (S.C., A.D.), leave to appeal refused 
(1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 560; 3 N.R. 2\4 (S.C.C.)) Brodie v. City of Halifax (No. 2) (1974), 
9 N.S.R. (2d) 415 (S.C., A.D.). 
13. See Dombrowski v. Boarrdo Governors of Dalhousie University and College (1974(1 15 
N.S.R. (2d) 314; 55 D.L.R. (3d) 268 (N.S.S.C, T.D.), affd (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 299 
(S.C., A.D.). 
14. See Committee for Justice end Liberty y. National Energy Board ar976), 9 N.R. 11.. In 
fact this case started as a case stated to the Federal Court of Appeal by the N.E.B. itself 
but the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in favour of Mr. Crowe (See (1975), 9 N.R. 
150 ; 65 D.L.R. (3d) 660 (sub nom. Re Canadian Arctic Gas Pipeline Ltd.)) was appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Canada by the public interest groups. 
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publicity in the media these past few weeks of an attempt to obtain 
judicial review of a decision designating an area as the site of the new 
Halifax rubbish dump.14" We have also heard a lot about the decision 
of the Ontario Divisional Court blocking the closure of Doctors' 
Hospital in Toronto.14b 
Does this factual catalogue tell very much about the effectiveness 
of judicial review of administrative action? First, it tells us that some 
people have been successful in court and, by one yardstick, that is a 
measure of effectiveness. However, the question is by what other 
standards is effectiveness to be measured? Does success in court really 
amount to very much even for the individual successful plaintiff? 
These are the questions explored so well by Bill Angus in his paper, 
Judicial Review — Do We Need It! and I will return to these 
considerations in a very few moments. Secondly, the catalogue that I 
have just recited may tell us that judicial review of administrative 
action is becoming a much more visible process. Undoubtedly, the 
publicity has always been there, but it is my view that the frequency of 
the publicity is becoming greater. Later in my paper, 1 will return to 
this factor as a criterion of effectiveness and as a justification for 
judicial review of administrative action. 
Ill - Success as a Criterion of Effectiveness 
At the practical and important level of a solicitor advising a client 
whether it is worthwhile seeking judicial review of administrative 
action, the prospects of success in court are obviously in many cases 
the most important criterion from the client's point of view. I say 
"many" rather than "all" cases for two reasons. 
First, and most importantly, as Bill Angus has demonstrated 
more than amply, success in court does not necessarily mean ultimate 
success and, if the chances of ultimate success are slim, the utility of 
going to court, even if the prospects there are good, is marginal.15 The 
reviewable abuse of discretion can the next time round be so easily 
14a This matter has now been litigated on an interlocutory application up to the Appeal 
Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and leave may be sought to appeal the judg-
ment of that court to the Supreme Court of Canada. In essence, on an interlocutory ap-
plication as to the appropriateness of one of the parties suing, the Appeal Division decided 
that the issues raised by the action for declarations of invalidity were not justiciable. See 
Attorney-General (Nova Scotia) v. Bedford Service Commission, S.H. 10163, judgment 
delivered : October 27, 1976, as yet unreported (N.S.S.C., A.D.). 
14b. Re Doctors Hospital and Minister of Health (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 164 (Div. Ct.). 
15. See The Individual and the Bureaucracy, supra, note 4 at 106-110. 
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turned into exactly the same result, expressed in impeccable, unreview-
able language. The decision taken in breach of the rules of natural 
justice can also easily become the same decision, following the use of 
the most judicial-like procedures. In extreme cases, success in court 
may lead to retroactive legislative change. Along the same lines is the 
consideration, in the case of those who appear before the same 
tribunal frequently, of whether a successful application for judicial 
review may prejudice subsequent dealings with that tribunal in 
different matters. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the chances of success in court 
may be of little relevance in some contexts because the only interest of 
the applicant for judicial review may be to delay the administrative 
process. As Professor Weiler points out in his paper, The Administra-
tive Tribunal: A View from the Inside, this is not infrequent in the 
labour field.16 A variation on this same theme is the example given by 
John Willis, of the lawyer who deals frequently with a particular 
tribunal and, rather than being afraid of the consequences for future 
dealings of seeking judicial review, slaps a writ of certiorari on the 
tribunal every so often to keep it honest.17 There too, success in court 
may be a relatively minor consideration, at least for the lawyer, if not 
for the client. 
Just as an aside, it could be that the recent challenge to the bias 
of Mr. Crowe, Chairman of the National Energy Board, demonstra-
ted a growing awareness on the part of consumer and public interest 
groups of the place of the "tactical" application for judicial review. 1 
merely pose the question without knowing the answer. Were the 
Committee for Justice and Liberty, the Consumers' Association of 
Canada and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee as concerned 
with the bias of Mr. Crowe and the need to replace him as they were 
with the consideration that an appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, whether successful or not, would show the National Energy 
Board that the groups were not to be trifled with at the pipeline 
hearings and, perhaps in the last analysis, this emphasis of their 
presence might just have some impact on the final decision of the 
Board ? 
This type of attitude, when present, leads to a situation where 
those seeking judicial review see it not as anywhere near an end in 
itself, but rather as a part of a much broader political scenario — one 
of the tools by which ultimate ends are helped peripherally but 
16. Supra, note 3 at 208. 
17. Supra, note 1 at 234; citing (1971) L.S.U.C. Special Lectures at 315. 
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nevertheless a tool which would not willingly be surrendered. In such 
instances, the answer to the question "Is judicial review effective?" is 
no more than "We think it helps" and the embittered response of the 
tribunal being challenged (and, in most cases, parties on the other 
side) is "What business has this group got perverting the judicial 
process and ruining our efficiency and effectiveness?" As a final note 
on this point, it must, of course, be said that the costs involved in a 
journey to the Supreme Court of Canada still must place a premium 
on the use of such tactical judicial review by public interest groups and 
this is a point that I will take up again in another context later. 
To return now to the question of success before the courts as a 
criterion: where judicial review of administrative action is concerned, 
according to Bill Angus' statistics, the chances of successful review 
would seem, at least in Ontario, to be less than fifty per cent.18 Add to 
this the costs of litigation, successful and unsuccessful, and the further 
peril that the tribunal may never give you what you want, even after 
successful litigation, and the case for the frequent use of judicial 
review is not at all strong. In a great many instances, the prudent 
advice must be that the risks are great and the ultimate gains few. Of 
course, this applies more particularly to cases based on procedural 
unfairness and abuse of discretion than it does to jurisdictional 
challenges and such matters as applications to quash regulations and 
by-laws and proceedings to compel the issue of building permits. 
These latter cases are instances where success in the courts generally 
leads to ultimate success but, even here, the question is one of whether 
success in the courts is likely. 
In summary, therefore, to point to a number of recent instances 
where the Nova Scotia courts have reviewed administrative action 
invites the retort from Bill Angus : "But what about the cases which 
failed? What are the statistics on the success rate of judicial review 
applications in Nova Scotia generally? Did success in the courts 
ensure the successful applicants an ultimate triumph over the adminis-
trative process?" 
IV - Other Criteria of Effectiveness 
Of course, even if it were possible to point to a 75% success rate in 
judicial review applications (which would be most unusual), the other 
half of the Angus/Hogg Osgoode team would then come at you with 
18. Supra, note 15 at 105-106. 
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guns blazing.19 The arguments would almost certainly be : (a) Unless 
Nova Scotia has a particularly poor set of administrative tribunals 
and other administrative decision-makers, such a high percentage of 
successful judicial review applications must mean that the courts are 
intervening far too readily in the administrative process and (b) Even 
if such a high level of review can be justified in terms of the technical 
law, what is it doing to the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
administrative process in your province? 
Here, of course, the focus has changed and effectiveness has been 
measured not in terms of the position of the individual applicant for 
judicial review, but rather in terms of the administrative process itself 
and its own concern for a "proper" relationship between it and the 
courts. The argument also, and more importantly, purportedly speaks 
to the question of where objectively the balance is to be struck in that 
relationship between the administrative process and the courts. 
The familiar arguments are, of course, that the courts have a very 
limited role to play in relation to the administrative process. Histori-
cally, the remedies for unlawful administrative action were known as 
the extraordinary writs, connoting what they should arguably remain 
today : a reserve power to be used in the event of serious and patent 
error. In matters relating to its statute, the administrative tribunal not 
only is intended to be but actually is more expert than the generalist 
superior court. Its day-to-day involvement with that statute makes it 
far more likely that it will have a much greater familiarity with the 
intricacies and nuances of the legislation, as well as its underlying 
social purpose, than the ordinary courts of the land. The attitude of 
the courts should be therefore to exercise remarkable restraint when 
asked to review and only intervene when it is abundantly clear that the 
tribunal has ignored its statutory mandate and gone oft on a frolic of 
its own or where, in Professor Hogg's terms, "its action is out of 
harmony with the' legal order as a whole"20 or review is needed "to 
protect fundamental civil libertarian" values.21 
Beyond this, the argument becomes cost-effectiveness oriented. 
Every judicial review application involves not only cost to the 
applicant for relief but great costs to the administrative process and 
the other parties involved in that process. And the costs here are not 
19. See supra, note 4. Also "The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 
1949-1971", (1973) 11 Osgoode Hall LJ. 187. 
20. Id., at 99. 
21. Id. 
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only the actual costs of the litigation, but the costs of delay and 
disruption of the orderly functioning of the administrative process, 
factors which, in many instances, have effects well beyond the 
boundaries of the particular case. For instance, the point at issue 
before the courts may well affect many matters coming before the 
same administrative tribunal. To proceed to these other matters 
before the litigated issue is settled judicially invites trouble, yet to wait 
may involve administrative chaos. 
Everything that I have just said is almost certainly quite trite. 
However, I say it again simply to make the point that there are a 
number of perspectives from which to view the question asked: 
"Judicial Restraints or Administrative Action : Effective or Illusory?" 
For the administrative tribunal or administrative decision-maker, 
effectiveness connotes little or no judicial review. More objectively 
than that, the arguments of relative expertise might also be seen to 
dictate that effective judicial review is both infrequent and limited. 
To change tack once again, it should also be pointed out that a 
great amount of judicial review litigation, as there indeed seems to be 
nowadays, does not necessarily mean that all who should be are 
litigating. Bill Angus in a section of his paper entitled Who Uses 
Judicial Review! confirms that the bulk of judicial review applications 
come in labour relations matters, professional discipline cases, zoning 
problems, licensing and tax assessment.22 The cost of litigation 
dictates the effectiveness of access in this as in all other fields and, 
despite legal aid, there has not as yet been any great groundswell of 
litigation against low level administrators, who affect the poor by their 
decisions and where we tend to assume from time to time that real 
abuses of discretion are occurring — a not unpredictable situation if 
the qualifications for the position are lesser. However, there must be a 
recognition that here the answer may really be internal, cheap and 
efficient statutory appeal structures rather than an ill-advised attempt 
to increase the incidence of judicial review of low level administrators. 
Such procedures, of course, exist already in many areas of statutory 
decision-making, and to a greater or lesser extent, in most provinces, 
are supplemented by an Ombudsman. If these methods are working 
well, the effectiveness of judicial review is not necessarily brought into 
question by the limited class of persons who use it. 
22. Supra, note IS at 112-113. 
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V - Back to Nova Scotia 
The search for criteria by which to evaluate the effectiveness of 
judicial review of administrative action leads one down many paths, 
paths which often head in completely opposite directions and, just to 
re-emphasize this point, I would like to return to the Nova Scotia 
cases that I mentioned in passing some minutes ago. 
Judged by the criterion of success in court, all except two meet 
the test of effectiveness. But even here the caveat must be entered that 
they are just random samples and do not tell us anything of those who 
failed. We also do not know what happened ultimately. For example, 
there is still talk that the city will somehow or other block the new 
Dalhousie University sports complex. The question must also be 
raised as to whether success in court was bought at too high a cost. 
McNeil is probably by no means as an important decision as 
Roncarelli v. Duplessis," but Mr. McNeil's continued public solicita-
tion of funds to meet his large legal expenses makes me fear at times 
that he will be reduced by his litigation to the same state of 
impoverishment that Roncarelli was. 
Viewed from other perspectives, questions can also be raised 
about the other cases where the applicant was successful. Were the 
public interest and, more particularly, the interest of the neighbouring 
landowners really sacrificed by the decision in the Dalhousie case, just 
because the university barely filed its application for a building permit 
before the City gave clear notice of an intention to rezone the land in 
question? Should the Lord Nelson Hotel Ltd., relying on its status as 
a neighbouring landowner and concerned citizen, really have been able 
to halt the erection of a new hotel when its real concern was not the 
amenities of the neighbourhood but the avoidance of competition? 
Should valuable court time be wasted on deciding whether a provincial 
magistrate has authority to require lawyers in his court to gown? 
Would not this matter have been best settled by consultation between 
the Barristers' Society, the Attorney General and the magistrate 
concerned or left to be? Have the Nova Scotia Teachers' Union's 
disciplinary powers now been hamstrung by the imposition of 
inappropriate judicial-like procedures as a result of the decision in the 
Busche case? Did the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court misinterpret the relevant legislation and fail to pay sufficient 
respect to the expertise of the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board in 
the Schwartz case? 
23. [1959] S.C.R. 121. 
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Questions can also be raised about the effectiveness of judicial 
review of administrative action by the two losing cases to which I 
referred. Was the use of judicial review by Brodie, a representative 
citizen, as part of the overall tactics to halt the proposed Quinpool 
Road development, a justifiable step? Has the public interest now 
been served by the fact that the land is still vacant and the City pays out 
large sums monthly in interest on the property? Do we think it is a 
good thing that people like Dombrowski should enjoy their day in 
court, even if the chances of success are slim ? 
Let it not be thought that in each of these questions I believe that 
the answer should be against the decision to review or against the 
availability of the judicial review process. Far from it ! Rather, the 
only point that I am making is that the criteria against which the 
effectiveness of judicial review is to be measured are many and varied 
and none of the questions posed is easy to answer. 
VI - The Profession of Faith 
I come now to the last part of my paper, the part which Professor 
Willis would describe as the "theological"24 section. Having come this 
far, and I hope this is not too disappointing for Don Carter, I find 
myself still unable to disagree with Bill Angus' argument that judicial 
review of administrative action is an expensive and chancy business to 
be warned against strongly in most instances when the possibility is 
raised. I also find myself convinced for the most part by Peter Hogg's 
arguments that only very limited judicial review can be justified, 
though perhaps I do not accept some of the details of his conclusions. 
Given an acceptance of these two arguments, the next question 
that is raised is whether I should go one step further and accept that 
judicial review is not really necessary or, perhaps just a half step, and 
accept that it is not really necessary for some tribunals or statutory 
decision-makers — in other words should not be constitutionally 
guaranteed ? 
First, let me say that, on this question, I do not think that it is 
really relevant that the number of judicial review cases represents but 
the tip of an enormous iceberg of uncontested administrative deci-
sions. My students should know this fact and I should also keep myself 
constantly aware of it, but, in the last analysis, is the situation any 
different, for example, from the proportion of litigated contracts and 
24. Supra, note 1 at 22S and seriatim. 
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marriages to unlitigated contracts and marriages? Certainly it may be 
argued that a comparative lack of judicial review applications and 
little successful judicial review can lead to both a lack of understand-
ing of the administrative process by the courts and a lack of attention 
to the role of the courts by the administrative process. However, it 
seems to me that the first of these problems may go more to judicial 
selection and the possibility of a specialised administrative court than 
to the need for review. As far as the effect of the role of the courts on 
the administrative process, tip of the iceberg or not, I believe that most 
important tribunals are aware very acutely of the role that the courts 
play in the supervision of the administrative process. Desirable or not, 
this fact is probably brought home to them in many instances by the 
tactical certiorari or appeal to keep them honest. 
Second, before coming to the substance of my argument that a 
guaranteed core of judicial review is important {ergo effective?) 
despite all the drawbacks, let me also say that that argument is not 
meant to commit me to all aspects of judicial review as it is practised 
presently by the courts. As mentioned previously, I share some of 
Peter Hogg's beliefs as to the limited, exceptional or reserve nature of 
judicial review. I also believe with John Willis that judicial review 
should in many instances be tailored to the particular statutory 
context and "review" by way of a clearly-defined statutory appeal 
provision could accomplish this.25 
In making the argument for judicial review as an important 
component of administrative law, the difficulty that I have is in 
drawing the line between a healthy respect for traditional institutions, 
such as the courts and the lesson that I draw from history, both 
ancient and modern, that there is some need for controls on 
administrative power, on the one hand, and the image, so vigorously 
debunked by Professor Willis, of the Royal Courts springing to the 
defence of every poor individual being badgered unmercifully by an 
amorphous and capricious State,26 on the other. This latter notion 
ranks as one of the most laughable yet widely accepted legal fictions of 
all time, yet somewhere at its roots is the genesis of what judicial 
review is all about and why it is needed. 
The argument for a guaranteed core of judicial review also 
becomes harder to make in the face of Professor Weiler's very strong 
arguments for the complete exclusion of the courts from the British 
25. See particularly his "The McRuer Report : Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants Values", 
(1968) 18 V.T.LJ. 351 at 359, cited id. at 244. 
26. Supra, note 1 at 228,234 and 244 particularly. 
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Columbia Labour Relations Board's activities that he makes in his 
paper, "The Administrative Tribunal : A View from the Inside".27 
Basically, the point that he makes is that there are so many other 
checks and balances present not only in the internal mechanisms of the 
Board but also in the external pressures on the Board, that the courts 
are, in view of their past record in labour relations, not only 
undesirable but also unnecessary. The Board simply cannot go off on a 
frolic of its own without being checked very swiftly and, if that is all 
we want to achieve by judicial review, it is no longer necessary in this 
particular context. To be more specific he sees these effective restraints 
in: 
1. Internal administrative review of the Board decisions. 
2. An eighteen-member Board representing "a wide spectrum of 
trade-union and employer groups". 
3. The high visibility that labour relations has in British Columbia 
with the Minister of Labour and other legislators, a visibility that 
would lead not only to early amendment, if the Board went on a 
frolic of its own, but also which has insured dialogue between... 
... the Board and the legislature [Executive?] in the refinement of labour 
law policy, a dialogue which it would be difficult if not impossible to 
duplicate with the judiciary.2* 
Undoubtedly, these checks described by Weiler will ensure that 
judicial review is seldom, if ever, necessary with respect to the British 
Columbia Labour Relations process. Indeed, they can be seen from 
one point of view as ensuring everything that judicial review ever 
achieved and less — in the sense that they avoid largely the costs and 
disruptions of judicial review, which at times, if one is to believe the 
Labour Law commentators, has been so misguided. 
Judicial review of administrative action has in this country 
received a bad name largely because of its spotty record in the labour 
relations area. Not that it might not have come to have a bad name 
anyway, but the quantity of litigation and the level of feeling generated 
in the labour law area has ensured that much of the commentary on 
judicial review has had its starting point and focus in the courts' 
performance in labour relations cases. From this standpoint, it is 
relatively easy to fall into arguing that the courts should be excluded 
from judicial review of the labour relations process completely and 
then, perhaps, to move further and say that judicial review generally is 
a bad thing and should be excluded completely. 
27. Supra, note 3 at 207-210. 
28. Id., 209-210. 
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Jaffe, whose views on the need for judicial review of administra-
tive action Professor Weiler notes with respect,2'' argues (and here we 
become really theological) :30 
The complete representative administration is a professional mirage, 
whether we look to actual administrations (even the very good ones) or 
resort to more abstract inquiry. Representation means organized purpose, 
and at one time no more than a fraction of the potential infinity of 
organized purposes are in being. Policy means choice, decisions, direc-
tions : and if policy is to have any stability or weight, any creative drive, it 
will almost inevitably be a choice of one interest over others. Administra-
tion, then, as the active principle of choosing, or preferring (be it for the 
most part wisely, fairly, kindly) has in it the inherent power to hurt, to 
awaken resentment, to stir the sense of injustice. By its very nature, 
because it is challenged to hammer out policy against opposition, it is 
driven almost inevitably to seek allies and to provide cement for its 
alliances. 
From this theological statement, which I share, he proceeds to argue 
for the necessity for independent review of administrative action, 
review which he sees as best reposed in the ordinary courts to which 
the country looks "for its ultimate protection against executive 
abuse".31 
All this is written against the background of a system where the 
role of the judiciary is constitutionally much more sacrosanct than it is 
in Canada, particularly if we believe the thesis of Peter Hogg's paper. 
However, even accepting the patent falsity in fact of the courts' knight 
in shining armour image, theoretically the model of review by superior 
courts appeals as a necessary check against the tendencies identified 
by Jaffe. Furthermore, the high visibility (if not high reputation) that 
the courts have had in the past and the higher visibility that they may 
be achieving today in Canada continues to make them, in a practical 
sense, the organs of our political system in which the greatest number 
of people would say a counterweight to excessive administration rests. 
In conclusion, to reduce it all to the labour law area again, it 
seems to me that it is vitally important to have the courts, admittedly 
in a very reserve role, when the unlikely day comes when the internal 
and external checks, with which the British Columbia Labour Rela-
29. See id., at 207, n. 12. 
30. L. JAFFE, Judicial Control of Administrative ection, Boston, ,ittle, ,rown, Abridged 
Student Edition, 1965, at 323. 
31. Id. at 324. Note at 327, Jaffe accepts that in some particular instances there may be a case-
for the removal of judicial review and he may possibly view Canadian Labour Relarions as 
one such instance. 
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tions has surrounded itself, fail. This is, of course, not to criticize those 
checks. Indeed, one looks for their repetition in all good administra-
tion. It is simply to argue, as Jaffe has done, that they may not be 
enough given the natural tendencies of even good administrations. It is 
also simply to argue, as Peter Hogg has done, that we need something 
to guard against the day when all the internal and political checks 
conspire together to pose a threat to "fundamental civil libertarian 
values"32 and "the legal order as a whole".33 When judged as a system 
which produces satisfactory end results for the people who use it, 
judicial review of administrative action ranks low in effectiveness. In 
terms of its effect on the administrative process, it has at times been a 
quite disruptive, even destructive influence. Viewed qualitatively, the 
level of intervention has not at times been high. It by no means goes 
towards ensuring equality of access. Yet, in the last analysis, I would 
maintain that the power of judicial review, albeit improved and albeit 
of an extraordinary nature in many situations, is a necessary part of an 
effective political system in our traditions. 
32. Supra, note 20. 
33. Supra, note 21. 
